Oil Price Shocks and Currency Denomination (A revised version of EWP 2005-01) by Wohltmann, Hans-Werner & Winkler, Roland C.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Wohltmann, Hans-Werner; Winkler, Roland C.
Working Paper
Oil Price Shocks and Currency
Denomination (A revised version of
EWP 2005-01)
Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics,
No. 2005,10
Provided in cooperation with:
Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel (CAU)
Suggested citation: Wohltmann, Hans-Werner; Winkler, Roland C. (2005) : Oil Price Shocks
and Currency Denomination (A revised version of EWP 2005-01), Economics working
paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics, No. 2005,10, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/21998Oil Price Shocks and Currency Denomination
(A revised version of EWP 2005-01)
(
by Hans-Werner Wohltmann and Roland Winkler
No 2005-10





The paper analyzes the dynamic e®ects of anticipated price increases of imported raw
materials upon two large open economies. It is assumed that the economies have an
asymmetric macroeconomic structure on the supply side and are dependent upon a
small third country for oil or raw materials imports. The dynamic behavior of several
macroeconomic variables is discussed both under US dollar and Euro-currency de-
nomination. It is shown that with Euro-currency denominated oil the stag°ationary
e®ects of oil price increases upon both the domestic and foreign economy are reduced.
The paper also discusses several monetary policy responses to oil price shocks.
JEL classi¯cation: E63, F42, Q43
Keywords: oil price shocks, international policy coordination, currency denomination
*Corresponding author: Prof. Dr. Hans-Werner Wohltmann, University of Kiel, De-
partment of Economics, Olshausenstr. 40, D-24098 Kiel, Germany, Phone: ++49-431-
880-1444, Fax: ++49-431-880-3150, Email: wohltmann@economics.uni-kiel.de
**Dipl.-Volksw. Roland Winkler, University of Kiel, Department of Economics, Olshausen-
str. 40, D-24098 Kiel, Germany, Phone: ++49-431-880-1472, Fax: ++49-431-880-3150,
Email: winkler@economics.uni-kiel.de1 Introduction
This paper deals with the macroeconomic theory of oil price shocks1 and analyzes the
dynamic e®ects of anticipated price increases of raw materials imports upon two large
open economies. It is assumed that the domestic and the foreign economy are symmetric
on the demand side but have an asymmetric macroeconomic structure on the supply side.
For the production of their respective ¯nal good imported inputs are necessary. Both
economies are dependent upon a small third country for raw materials imports (like crude
oil). We can identify the small oil-exporting country with the OPEC nations and the
domestic and the foreign economy with the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the
USA respectively. It is assumed that the dependency on oil imports is stronger for the
domestic than the foreign economy and that oil imports are priced in terms of the foreign
currency (dollars). We then discuss the dynamic e®ects of an anticipated once-and-for-all
rise of the price of oil upon several domestic and foreign macroeconomic variables, like
real output, in°ation rate, real interest rate and terms of trade. The theoretical analysis
is motivated by the substantial increase of the price of crude oil and other raw materials
prices in recent years, which are expected to be permanent.2 The discussion is based on a
macrodynamic model of two large open oil-dependent economies. The paper ¯rst analyzes
the dynamic e®ects of oil price shocks, if raw materials imports are denominated in terms
of the foreign currency. We then investigate the impacts of such price increases under
alternative currency denomination of oil imports. It is shown that the decision of the
OPEC nations to denominate their oil exports in terms of Euro rather than US dollars
substantially reduces the stag°ationary e®ects of oil price increases on both the domestic
and foreign economy.
The paper also discusses the e®ects of various monetary policy rules that could be
employed by the domestic and the foreign economy in an e®ort to reduce or neutralize
the potentially disruptive e®ects of oil price shocks. In what follows we use the terms
oil imports and raw materials imports interchangeably. The implications of this paper go
well beyond the role of imported raw materials in an open economy. In fact, it can also
be applied to all intermediate goods produced and used for domestic production.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the dynamic model of two large
oil-dependent economies. Section 3 analyzes the dynamic e®ects of an anticipated price
increase of raw materials imports. It is assumed that oil imports are denominated in
terms of the foreign currency (US dollars). In section 4 the case of domestic-currency
denominated oil is discussed. We analyze the question whether both economies can be
better insulated against oil price shocks if the currency denomination of international raw
1For recent surveys see, for example, Brown and YÄ ucel (2002) or Jones, Leiby and Paik (2004).
2The average monthly US dollar price of crude oil (simple average of Dubai, Brent and WTI) has risen
from a low of 10.41 per barrel in December 1998 to an all-time high of 46.87 US$/bbl in October 2004.
Temporarily, the price has fallen to a low of 39.09 US$/bbl in December 2004, to continue rising afterwards.
The IMF Commodity Price Index which includes both Fuel and Non-Fuel Price Indices has risen from a
value of 69.38 in February 1999 to a value of 170.58 in February 2005 (cf. IMF (2005a)). The IMF (2005b)
extensively analyzes the global oil market and forecasts ongoing high oil prices for the next years.
1materials trade changes from US dollars to Euro. Section 5 discusses various monetary
policy responses to oil price shocks. In particular the problem is analyzed whether an
international coordination of monetary policy is able ¯x the domestic and foreign consumer
in°ation rate at their respective pre-disturbance steady state level. Section 6 summarizes
the main results. The paper includes a mathematical appendix, where the state space and
steady state representation of the dynamic macroeconomic model is discussed.
2 The Model
The following model stands in the Mundell/Fleming/Dornbusch/Phillips tradition and
generalizes similar models of Bhandari (1981) and Turnovsky (2000) to the case of large
oil-dependent economies.3 We consider two large open economies which are of equal size in
the initial steady state. Both countries use imported oil from a third small country for the
production of their respective domestic output. The following notation is employed: Dots
denote time derivatives and overbars indicate steady state values. All variables { except
for the interest rates i and i¤ { are logarithmized. Variables with a ¤ describe foreign
variables while variables without ¤ stand for domestic variables. The model is described
by the equations (1){(18):
q = (a0 + a1y ¡ a2(i ¡ E(_ pc))) + g + (c0 ¡ c1y + c2y¤ ¡ c3¿) (1)
q¤ = (a0 + a1y¤ ¡ a2(i¤ ¡ E(_ p¤c))) + g¤ ¡ (c0 ¡ c1y + c2y¤ ¡ c3¿) (2)
¿ = p ¡ (p¤ + e) (3)
m ¡ pc = l0 + l1q ¡ l2i (4)
m¤ ¡ p¤c = l0 + l1q¤ ¡ l2i¤ (5)
i = i¤ + E(_ e) (6)
pc = ®p + (1 ¡ ®)(p¤ + e) (0:5 < ® < 1) (7)
p¤c = ®¤p¤ + (1 ¡ ®¤)(p ¡ e) (0:5 < ®¤ < 1) (8)
y = q ¡ Ã(p¤
R + e ¡ p) ¡ d0 (9)
y¤ = q¤ ¡ Ã¤(p¤
R ¡ p¤) ¡ d0 (10)
_ p = ¹ _ w + (1 ¡ ¹)(_ p¤
R + _ e) (0 < ¹ < 1) (11)
_ p¤ = ¹¤ _ w¤ + (1 ¡ ¹¤)_ p¤
R (0 < ¹¤ < 1) (12)
_ w = ¼ + ±(q ¡ q) (13)
_ w¤ = ¼¤ + ±¤(q¤ ¡ q¤) (14)
¼ = ¯ _ m + (1 ¡ ¯)E(_ pc) (0 · ¯ · 1) (15)
¼¤ = ¯¤ _ m¤ + (1 ¡ ¯¤)E(_ p¤c) (0 · ¯¤ · 1) (16)
q = f0 + f1¿ + f2(p ¡ (p¤






3Wohltmann and Clausen (2002) analyze the dynamic e®ects of oil price shocks in a small asymmetric
monetary union and the implications for common monetary policy.
2where q = real output, y = real income, i = nominal interest rate, i ¡ E(_ pc) = expected
real interest rate, g = real government expenditure, p = domestic price of domestic output,
¿ = ¯nal goods terms of trade, e = nominal exchange rate (domestic currency price of
foreign currency), m = nominal money stock, w = nominal wage rate, pc = consumer price
index, ¼ = augmentation term in the Phillips curve, p¤
R = US dollar price of imported
raw materials or other intermediate goods, p ¡ (p¤
R + e) = intermediate goods terms of
trade, p¤
R + e ¡ p = real factor price of imported intermediate goods; a0, c0, d0, l0, f0,
f¤
0 = autonomous shift terms; a1, a2, c1, c2, c3, l1, l2, Ã, Ã¤, ±, ±¤, f1, f¤
1, f2, f¤
2 =
positive model parameters (which can be interpreted as elasticities or semi-elasticities). E
represents the expectations operator.
Equations (1) and (2) are standard IS equations and describe goods market equilibrium
in the respective economy. This requires real output to be equal to the sum of real private
absorption (¯rst expression in brackets), real government expenditure and the di®erence
between real exports and imports of ¯nal goods (second expression in brackets). Real
private absorption is assumed to depend positively on income and negatively upon the
expected real interest rate.4 As in Turnovsky (1986) the real interest rate is computed
using the in°ation rate based on the (rationally anticipated) consumer price index. Inter-
national trade in ¯nal goods (trade balance without imports of raw materials) depends
upon domestic and foreign income and the ¯nal goods terms of trade (de¯ned in (3)).
The IS equations are assumed symmetric so that in the trade balance c1 = c2 holds and
corresponding e®ects across the two economies are identical.
Equations (4) and (5) are LM equations and re°ect money market equilibrium. Money
demand is assumed to depend on real output rather than real income which is considered
a more appropriate measure of the volume of transactions. We assume symmetric money
demand functions. The nominal money stock is de°ated by the consumer price index
de¯ned in (7) and (8) respectively to allow for the fact that in open economies money
is also used for the purchase of imported goods. Equation (6) is the uncovered interest
parity condition and describes perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign bonds. The
domestic interest rate may deviate only by the rationally anticipated rate of depreciation
E(_ e) from the foreign interest rate. Since we assume a deterministic model E(_ e) coincides
with _ e.
Equation (9) (and similar (10)) links domestic production with real income or gross
national product. The di®erence between real output and income results from real inter-
mediate imports. Real imports of raw materials (or more generally: intermediate goods)
can be expressed in non-logarithmized form as the product of the real price of raw materi-
als (P¤
R¢E=P) and physical imports R (where capital letters refer to natural variables, and
imports of raw materials are denominated in terms of the foreign currency). If there is no
possibility of substituting labor or capital for oil in the production process there must be
4In discrete time New Neoclassical New Keynesian synthesis models, private absorption does not only
depend positively on the current income, but also depends positively on past and/or expected future
income (see, for example, Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999), King (2000) or
McCallum (2001)). In deterministic continuous time models (like ours) private absorption only depends
on the current income.
3a proportional relationship between the quantity R and the level of domestic production
Q of the form R = ·Q (0 < · < 1). In this case a logarithmic-linear approximation of
the relationship between the natural variables Y and Q leads to equation (9) where Ã is
of the form ·=(1 ¡ ·) provided that the initial value of the intermediate goods terms of
trade P=(P¤
R ¢ E) is normalized to one. If alternatively a CES production function is as-
sumed which allows for factor substitution between labor and oil, the constant Ã depends
on the elasticity of substitution between the factors of production and upon the share of
imported inputs in aggregate production (Bhandari and Turnovsky, 1984).5 An analogue
equation holds for the relationship between foreign production and foreign income where
the real factor price for oil is now given by p¤
R ¡ p¤. If we identify the foreign economy
with the USA and the domestic economy with the European Monetary Union (EMU) it
is reasonable to assume Ã > Ã¤, i.e. a stronger dependency on oil imports for EMU than
for the USA.6
The equations (11) and (12) describe price adjustment in the domestic and foreign
economy respectively. In both countries the in°ation rate is determined by a weighted
average of nominal wage in°ation and the rate of change of the domestic price of raw
materials imports. The corresponding weights ¹ and 1 ¡ ¹ re°ect the average share of
wage and raw materials costs respectively in the overall variable costs of a representative
¯rm. The expression 1 ¡ ¹ can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of openness of
the domestic economy on the supply side, while the parameter 1 ¡ ® in the price index
de¯nition (7) re°ects the openness of the domestic economy with respect to the large open
foreign economy on the demand side (Bhandari and Turnovsky, 1984). We assume ® < ®¤
and ¹ < ¹¤ so that the domestic economy has a greater degree of openness both on the
demand and supply side. The equations (11) and (12) are dynamic versions of mark-up
pricing rules which are widely used in applied and theoretical economics (Bhandari, 1981).
Equations (13) and (14) describe the dynamics of wage adjustment which take the
form of an augmented Phillips curve (Buiter and Miller, 1982). The augmentation term is
according to (15) and (16) a ¯xed weight linear combination of the trend and the consumer
price rate of in°ation, the ¯rst given by the growth rate of money supply and the second
by the (rationally anticipated) in°ation rate based on the consumer price index.7 In
the special case ¯ = 1 and a given growth rate of money supply the wage adjustment
mechanism is consistent with nominal wage rigidity (van der Ploeg, 1990). In the other
polar case ¯ = 0 the growth rate of the real wage rate _ w ¡ _ pc only depends on the output
gap q ¡ q so that real wage rigidity occurs if the parameter ± equals zero. We assume
5Now Ã is of the form (1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¾)=¹ where ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and oil and
where ¹ and 1 ¡ ¹ measure the share of labor and imported inputs in gross output respectively.
6In addition to the oil dependency, i.e. the ratio of net oil imports to GDP, the oil intensity, i.e. the ratio
of oil consumption to GDP, is greater for the EMU than for the USA (Anderton, di Mauro and Moneta
(2004)). Note that our model assumption regarding the dependency of the two large open economies on
imported raw materials produced only by a third small country leads to an identity of these concepts.
7The formulation of the in°ation dynamics can also be interpreted as a special type of a continuous time
hybrid Phillips curve. In a discrete time model the hybrid Phillips curve formulation allows in°ation to
depend on expected future and lagged in°ation (see, for example, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999)). Instead of a
backward-looking element in the hybrid Phillips curve, we model a dependency of the in°ation dynamics
on the trend in°ation rate given by the growth rate of money supply.
4asymmetric wage adjustment dynamics across the two large open economies. In the EMU
the degree of wage indexation is typically greater than in the USA; we therefore assume
¯ < ¯¤ (cf. Manasse, 1991, OECD, 2000).8
The last two equations (17) and (18) describe long run aggregate supply functions.
In the long run, assuming labor market equilibrium where labor demand is a negative
function of the producer and labor supply a positive function of the consumer real wage
rate and, in addition, assuming a perfectly elastic raw materials supply, output supply
depends positively on the ¯nal and intermediate goods terms of trade.9 Since the domestic
economy is assumed stronger oil-dependent than the foreign economy the parameter f2 is
typically greater than f¤
2.
In the following we will show that as a result of the assumed asymmetries on the supply
side anticipated oil price increases generate adjustment dynamics and steady state e®ects
which di®er considerably across the two economies. In particular it will be demonstrated
that in the long run the stag°ationary e®ects of oil price shocks are stronger for the
domestic than for the foreign economy.
The dynamic behavior of the whole model (1)-(18) can be described by a third-order
dynamic system. In the case of positive growth rates of domestic and foreign money supply
the dynamics of the system can be summarized conveniently in terms of real liquidity and
real competitiveness (Buiter and Miller, 1982). According to the decomposition method
by Aoki (1981) and its generalization by Fukuda (1993) we use the state variables ls, ld
and ¿, where
ls = (m ¡ p) + (m¤ ¡ p¤); ld = (m ¡ p) ¡ (m¤ ¡ p¤) (19)
Both the sum and the di®erence of domestic and foreign real liquidity are backward-
looking or predetermined variables (containing the sluggish price variables p and p¤), while
the terms of trade ¿ is a forward-looking or jump variable which moves discontinuously
whenever the nominal exchange rate jumps. Note that the in°ation rates _ p and _ p¤ are
jump variables as well that can adjust instantaneously although the adjustment of wages
and prices is sluggish. The state space representation of the model is provided in the
mathematical appendix. In general it is not possible to decompose the dynamics of the
whole system into an aggregate and a di®erence system wich can be solved independently.10
Nevertheless, the state space form of the model exhibits saddle point stability. The system
matrix has a positive determinant and the number of stable eigenvalues (two) coincides
with the number of predetermined state variables.11 In the following we assume that at
8The special case of real and nominal wage rigidity, i.e. ¯ = ¯
¤ = 0 and ¯ = ¯
¤ = 1 respectively, is
discussed at length in Wohltmann und Winkler (2005).
9A more detailed theoretical derivation of the role of the terms of trade in aggregate supply is given in
Devereux and Purvis (1990). The supply equations (17) and (18) can also be derived by assuming long
run static price and wage equations of the form p = ¹w + (1 ¡ ¹)(p
¤
R + e), p
¤ = ¹
¤w
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10This is only the case if the supply side of the whole system is symmetric (Ã = Ã
¤, ¹ = ¹
¤).
11Cf. Buiter (1984) and Turnovsky (2000). Note that the stable eigenvalues of the system decrease in
absolute terms if the degree of supply-side openness (i.e., 1 ¡ ¹) increases. For very large (empirically
5time t = 0 the world economy is in steady state. At time 0 a once-and-for-all increase in
the price of imported raw materials (dp¤
R > 0) is anticipated to take e®ect at some future
time T > 0. For example, we can assume that the OPEC credibly announces in t = 0
a once-and-for-all price increase of crude oil to happen at the future date T > 0. The
following chapter discusses the dynamic e®ects of such an oil price shock upon the EMU
and the USA. In particular, the anticipation e®ects of announced oil price increases are
analyzed.
3 Dynamic E®ects of an Oil Price Increase
We ¯rst consider the long run or steady state e®ects of a once-and-for-all increase in the
dollar price of OPEC oil, p¤
R.12 The steady state e®ects of this disturbance result from the
equilibrium condition _ ¿ = 0 = _ ls = _ ld for the state space representation of the dynamics
of the whole system. The equilibrium condition implies that in line with monetarism the
long run producer and consumer price in°ation as well as the rate of depreciation _ e are
only determined by the growth rate of domestic and foreign money supply (_ p = _ pc = _ m,
_ p¤ = _ p¤c = _ m¤, _ e = _ m ¡ _ m¤). This implies that an oil price shock of the form dp¤
R > 0
can only cause temporary in°ation in the domestic and foreign economy. On the other
hand, a rise in the price of oil leads to a permanent change in the level of the state
variables ¿, ls and ld. If we assume that the nominal money stock is constant in both
economies ( _ m = _ m¤ = 0), steady state levels of the domestic and foreign price levels and
the nominal exchange rate exist. Since the domestic is stronger oil-dependent than the
foreign economy, the foreign price shock causes a steady state increase of the domestic
producer price level (dp > 0) which is stronger than equilibrium rise of the foreign price
level (dp > dp¤). This implies a fall both in the steady state level of aggregate real money
stock (dl
s
< 0) and the real money stock di®erential (dl
d
< 0) and a permanent reduction
in domestic real money supply which is stronger than the decrease in foreign real money
stock (d(m ¡ p) < d(m¤ ¡ p¤)).13 Correspondingly, the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the
domestic currency price of foreign currency, increases in the long run (de > 0) implying a
stronger equilibrium rise of the domestic than the foreign price index (dpc > dp¤c). Under
the fairly weak necessary and su±cient condition
(1 ¡ a1 + 2c1)(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (20)
irrelevant) values of 1 ¡ ¹ the number of stable eigenvalues is smaller than the number of predetermined
state variables so that the saddle point stability gets lost (cf. Turnovsky (2000), p. 147 (Proposition 5.3).




0 is denoted by x0, the new steady state by x1.
13The decline of the equilibrium real money stock implies in isolation a rise in the steady state value of
the nominal interest rate. Since in long run equilibrium i = i
;¤ + _ m ¡ _ m
¤ and (i ¡ _ pc) ¡ (i ¡ _ p¤c) =
(1 ¡ (® + ®
¤))_ ¿ = 0 holds, it follows that the long run change of all nominal and real interest rates
coincides if there is no monetary growth (i.e., _ m = _ m
¤ = 0). Several numerical simulations show that the
oil price shock causes an increase in the equilibrium value of domestic and foreign interest rate. For large
values of the interest-rate semi-elasticity of money demand l2 the increase in i and i
¤ is weak.
6the equilibrium rise in the price di®erential p¡p¤ is greater than the steady state deprecia-
tion of the domestic currency so that the domestic ¯nal goods terms of trade ¿(= p¡p¤¡e)
increase in the long run (d¿ > 0). Generally, the steady state e®ect of the price shock
dp¤
R > 0 on the domestic terms of trade ¿ is not uniquely determined. This can be illus-
trated in a ¿=(q ¡ q¤)-diagram (cf. ¯gure 1) which contains the di®erence of the long run
IS equations (IS ¡ IS
¤), i.e.
(1 ¡ a1 + 2c1)(q ¡ q¤) = ¡(2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã)¿ + 2c0
+ g ¡ g¤ ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(p¤
R ¡ p¤) (21)
and the corresponding di®erence of the long run aggregate supply functions (AS ¡ AS
¤),
i.e.
q ¡ q¤ = f0 ¡ f¤
0 + (f1 + f¤
1 + f2)¿ ¡ (f2 ¡ f¤
2)(p¤
R ¡ p¤) (22)
The demand-side equilibrium curve IS ¡ IS
¤ has a negative slope provided that 2c3 >
(a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã holds.14 On the other hand, the supply-side curve AS ¡ AS
¤ is positively
sloped in ¿=(q ¡ q¤)-space.
Since an increase in the US dollar price of imported raw materials is accompanied by
a less than equivalent rise in the equilibrium foreign price level (dp¤
R > dp¤) the long run
foreign real price of raw materials inputs rises (d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) > 0). Due to our assumptions
Ã > Ã¤, f2 > f¤
2 the increase of the foreign real factor price induces a shift both of
the demand and supply curve to the left (see ¯gure 1).15 If inequality (20) holds the
long run supply curve AS ¡ AS
¤ moves further to the left than the long run demand
curve IS ¡ IS
¤. In this case a long run real appreciation of the domestic currency occurs
(d¿ > 0) although the nominal exchange rate permanently increases (de > 0). Figure 1
also illustrates that irrespective of the sign of the change of domestic ¯nal goods terms of
trade the oil price shock always causes a fall in the long run output di®erential q ¡ q¤ so
that dq < dq¤ holds. Under the weak assumption (20) the long run foreign supply function
(18) implies a permanent reduction in foreign output (dq¤ < 0). Therefore, domestic real
output also decreases in the long run. The domestic output contraction is stronger in the
domestic than in the foreign economy, although in case d¿ > 0 the rise of the domestic is
weaker than the increase of the foreign real factor price.16 The intuitive reason is that the
14Note that the assumption of a normal reaction of the domestic trade balance against the USA to changes
in the ¯nal goods terms of trade ¿ (i.e., c3 > 0) is not su±cient for a negative slope, since an increase in ¿
raises due to y = q +Ã¿ ¡Ã(p
¤
R ¡p
¤)¡d0 national income and domestic private absorption holding other
factors constant.
15The curve IS ¡ IS
¤
moves to the left since the rise in p¤
R ¡ p¤ leads to a stronger reduction in domestic
than in foreign income and absorption respectively.
16dq < dq
¤ also holds in the case d¿=dp
¤
R < 0. Due to the relationship p
¤
R ¡ p
¤ = ¿ + (p
¤
R + e ¡ p) the rise
in the long run foreign real price of oil (p¤
R ¡ p¤) is stronger (weaker) than the rise of the corresponding
domestic real factor price (p¤
R + e ¡ p) if d¿=dp
¤







and Ã > Ã
¤, there is also a fall in the equilibrium income di®erential (d(y ¡ y¤) < 0). Note that the degree
of output contraction strongly depends on the degree of oil-dependency of the economies. An increase in
the degree of supply-side openness (i.e., a rise in 1 ¡ ¹) leads to a tightening of the contractionary output
e®ects (cf. Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984)). Moreover, the in°ationary e®ects due to the oil price shock
are weaker but more persistent, if the degree of supply-side openness rises. See, for example, Romer (1993)
for a general discussion of the openness-in°ation relationship.
7domestic economy is stronger oil-dependent than the foreign economy and that oil imports
are priced in terms of the foreign currency (dollars). Due to the nominal depreciation of
the domestic currency, the oil price shock dp¤
R > 0 must have stronger negative e®ects on
the supply side of the domestic economy than upon the foreign economy.
As yet we have shown that in the long run a rise in the dollar-price of imported crude
oil has stronger stag°ationary e®ects for the EMU than the USA and that the equilibrium
nominal depreciation of the Euro is typically accompanied by a real appreciation of the
domestic currency.17 Although the increase in the steady state value of the terms of
trade ¿ worsens the domestic real trade balance against the US, the reduction of national
income, which is stronger than the steady state decline of foreign income (dy < dy¤ < 0)
in isolation leads to an improvement of the domestic equilibrium trade balance against
the US. The net e®ect is therefore ambiguous. If the negative terms of trade e®ect on the
domestic trade balance is not too large, the trade balance against the large foreign country
improves.18 A similar result holds if the equilibrium trade balance with respect to OPEC
is considered. In logarithmic terms, the steady state change of domestic real imports of
raw materials (dimR) is given by
dimR = dq + (1 ¡ ¾)d(p¤
R + e ¡ p) (23)
where ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and oil.19 While the domestic
output contraction leads to an equivalent fall in imR the rise of the real factor price of
oil increases real raw materials imports. The net e®ect is therefore ambiguous in sign.20
Several numerical simulations with realistic parameter values21 show that the output e®ect
dominates the opposite real factor price e®ect so that dimR is negative in general.22 This
implies that the equilibrium trade balance with respect to OPEC typically improves so
that the same holds for the overall trade balance of the domestic economy.23
Consider now the dynamic e®ects of an anticipated once-and-for-all increase in the
foreign price of raw materials imports for both the domestic and the foreign economy. If
the OPEC credibly announces at t = 0 that at some future date T the price of crude
oil will be raised, this on impact leads to a fall in the domestic ¯nal goods terms of
trade ¿, i.e. an immediate real and nominal depreciation of the domestic currency (cf.
17Similar results for small open economies can be found in Bhandari (1981) and Bhandari and Turnovsky
(1984).
18In Bhandari (1981) it is assumed that the terms of trade e®ect dominates the income e®ect so that the
real trade balance with respect to the USA is worsened.
19In Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984) ¾ is equal to 0:33 while in Bhandari (1981) ¾ = 0. Since real exports
of the domestic economy with respect to OPEC are negligible by assumption, the steady state change of
the trade balance with respect to OPEC equals ¡dimR.
20Cf. Bhandari (1981).
21The simulations are based on the parameter values a1 = 0:8, a2 = 1:0, c1 = 0:2, c3 = 0:3, ® = 0:75,
®
¤ = 0:8, l1 = 1, l2 = 1:5, ¹ = 0:7, ¹
¤ = 0:8, ¾ = ¾
¤ = 0:3, Ã = (1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¾)=¹ = 0:3, Ã




¤ = 0:175, ± = ±
¤ = 0:2, f1 = (1 ¡ ®)=± = 1:25, f
¤
1 = (1 ¡ ®
¤)=±
¤ = 1, f2 = (1 ¡ ¹)=(¹±) = 2:14286,
f
¤
2 = (1 ¡ ¹
¤)=(¹
¤±
¤) = 1:29, ¯ = 0:2, ¯
¤ = 0:8.
22The same holds for dim
¤
R, i.e. the steady state change of foreign real imports of raw materials.
23Several numerical simulations indicate that there is also an improvement of the overall trade balance
of the large foreign economy, although its bilateral trade balance with respect to the domestic economy
deteriorates in general and the fall of im
¤
R is weaker than the decline of imR.
8¯gure 2).24 After the initial jump the process of depreciation continues to hold during
the entire period between the announcement and the implementation of the oil price
increase. This is accompanied by a gradual rise in the domestic and a gradual fall in
the foreign price level (¯gure 3). The divergent responses of domestic and foreign price
level can be explained by the immediate domestic output increase and foreign output
decrease which cause temporary wage and price in°ation in the domestic and wage and
price de°ation in the foreign economy (¯gure 3). Due to the initial jump of e the increase
in the price di®erential p ¡ p¤ is weaker than the rise in the nominal exchange rate e
during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T so that the terms of trade ¿ fall until the input
price shock actually occurs. The exogenous price shock causes a larger output gap in the
domestic economy so that the in°ationary pressure initially is stronger in the domestic
than the foreign country. The larger jumps of the domestic price and wage in°ation rates
at time T lead to a stronger rise of domestic than foreign price level and a reversal in the
development of ¿, i.e. a process of real appreciation which is accompanied by a further
nominal devaluation of the domestic currency. For t > T the price and wage in°ation rates
start to decrease where the fall of the foreign in°ation rates is weaker than the decline
of the corresponding domestic nominal variables. This implies that during the course of
adjustment, for su±ciently large t > T, a delayed overshooting of ¿, e and p ¡ p¤ takes
place so that these variables have a hump-shaped adjustment for t > T and converge from
above to their respective new steady state level (cf. ¯gure 2).25
The announcement of a future oil price increase and the resulting real depreciation of
the domestic currency on impact lead to a rise in domestic and a fall in foreign output
so that the output di®erential q ¡ q¤ is positive in the short run. This is accompanied
by a positive di®erence of the income variables y and y¤ (¯gure 4).26 Thereafter, both
di®erence variables start to decrease and change sign during the course of adjustment (i.e.,
q < q¤ and y < y¤ for t su±ciently large). If the time span between the anticipation and
the implementation of the oil price increase is not too large, the reversal of the sign of
the output and income di®erential occurs at time T. After its initial increase domestic
output begins to fall (¯gure 4). The reason is the rise of the domestic real factor price
p¤
R + e ¡ p throughout the entire anticipation period (¯gure 5), which { in isolation {
reduces national income and private absorption. The same holds for the domestic real
interest rate i ¡ _ pc (¯gure 5). After its initial fall it increases until time T. During
this time span the rise of the in°ation rate based on the consumer price index, _ pc, is
connected with a stronger increase of domestic nominal interest rate leading to a further
reduction of private absorption. During the entire period between the announcement and
the implementation of the oil price increase both the rise of the domestic real interest
24The intuitive reason for the immediate rise of e is the stronger oil-dependency of the domestic economy.
The public therefore expects that the domestic economy will be stronger hit by the oil price hike than the
foreign economy.
25A delayed overshooting of exchange rates in response to monetary policy shocks was empirically found by,
for example, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).
26On impact, there is also a discontinuous decrease in the real interest rates i ¡ _ p
c and i
¤ ¡ _ p
c¤. Although
the instantaneous reduction of the domestic real interest rate is smaller than the fall of the corresponding
foreign variable, the output di®erential q ¡ q
¤ increases on impact.
9rate and domestic real price of imported raw materials is stronger than the change of
the corresponding foreign variables.27 After the initial jump domestic output decreases
therefore stronger than foreign output.28
At the date of implementation the increase of the nominal factor price p¤
R leads to an
equivalent rise of both the domestic and foreign real factor price (¯gure 5).29 Since the
domestic economy is { by assumption { stronger oil-dependent than the foreign economy,
the domestic output contraction at time T is greater than the corresponding foreign output
reduction.30 For t > T both output and income variables converge from above to their new
(smaller) steady state levels (¯gure 4). During the entire period after the implementation
of the oil price increase the output contraction is stronger for the domestic than the foreign
economy. The same holds for the domestic and foreign price e®ects after time T. For t > T
the domestic price level p lies above foreign price level p¤ (¯gure 3).31This implies that
the stag°ationary e®ects after the implementation of the oil price increase are stronger in
the domestic than in the foreign economy. On the other hand, stag°ationary outcomes
in the sense of simultaneous output contraction and price increases do not occur during
the anticipation phase. Domestic output rises on impact and lies above its initial steady
state level in the short run. In the foreign economy a disin°ationary process takes place
throughout the time interval 0 < t < T. A rise of the foreign price level only occurs after
the realization of the oil price shock.
Figure 5 also illustrates the adjustment dynamics of domestic and foreign real oil
imports. On impact, a rise in domestic real output and the domestic real factor price of
oil takes place. On the other hand, foreign output is reduced on impact while the foreign
real factor price initially remains constant. According to the import equations
imR = q + (1 ¡ ¾)(p¤
R + e ¡ p) (24)
im¤
R = q¤ + (1 ¡ ¾¤)(p¤
R ¡ p¤) (25)
this implies an increase in domestic real raw materials imports imR while foreign real oil
imports im¤
R decrease on impact. Since domestic real output lies above its initial steady
state level during the whole anticipation period and the real factor price p¤
R+e¡p increases
for 0 < t < T, imR runs above its initial value for 0 < t < T. For im¤
R just the opposite
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While both the domestic and foreign real factor price increase during the entire anticipation period, the
development of domestic and foreign real interest rate is of opposite direction. The foreign real interest
rate i
¤ ¡ _ p
¤c decreases for 0 < t < T. Similar results hold for corresponding nominal variables. During
the anticipation period 0 < t < T the domestic price and wage in°ation rates _ p, _ p
c and _ w as well as the
nominal interest rate i rise while the corresponding foreign variables fall.
28It is assumed that the terms of trade elasticity of the trade balance, c3, is not too large, since otherwise q¡q
¤
could rise for 0 < t < T. Note that for small values of the degree of supply-side openness a discontinuous
increase in domestic and foreign output is possible at time T. This result holds since domestic and foreign
real interest rate decrease strongly in T.
29It is assumed that the nominal exchange rate e only jumps at the date of anticipation.
30This result holds although domestic and foreign real interest rate decrease at time T discontinuously, and
the fall of domestic real interest rate is larger than the fall of the corresponding foreign variable.




R)0) although there is a moderate increase of the foreign real oil price
p¤
R ¡ p¤ due to the fall of the foreign price level p¤. The oil price shock in T leads to an
equivalent rise in the real factor prices p¤
R + e ¡ p and p¤
R ¡ p¤ so that imR and im¤
R rise
sharply in T.32 This result holds although real output discontinuously decreases in T. For
t > T the real factor prices and the output variables fall continuously leading to a gradual
decline of domestic and foreign raw materials imports. At the end of the adjustment
process imR and im¤
R lie below their respective initial steady state level implying a long
run improvement of the domestic and foreign trade balance with respect to OPEC. This
result holds although there is a steady state rise in the real factor price of oil. Due to
the assumption of a positive elasticity of substitution between labor and oil the long run
output contraction has a stronger (negative) e®ect on real oil imports than the opposing
e®ect of the factor price increase. The oil price shock only leads to a temporary rise of
real oil imports of the EMU and the USA from the OPEC nations.
4 Domestic-Currency Denominated Oil Imports
This section investigates the consequences of an increase of the price of oil imports being
denominated in terms of domestic rather than foreign currency. The discussion of this
question is motivated by the fact that the Euro is increasingly used in international trade
(ECB, 2005). The domestic real factor price of imported raw materials is now de¯ned by
pR ¡p where pR is the exogenously given input price denominated in terms of Euro. The
corresponding foreign real factor price of oil is given by pR ¡ e ¡ p¤. In qualitative terms
an anticipated increase in the (domestic-currency) price of imported raw materials has the
same steady state e®ects as in section 3 (i.e. long run stag°ation in both economies coupled
with a long run rise in the nominal exchange and interest rate and the domestic terms of
trade ¿). In case of domestic-currency denominated oil the steady state rise of the nominal
exchange rate has no direct e®ect on the domestic real factor price pR ¡p and causes { in
isolation { a reduction of the corresponding foreign raw materials price pR ¡ e ¡ p¤. This
implies that the changeover from foreign to domestic currency-denomination results in a
dampening of the long run domestic and foreign output contraction induced by a rise of
the price of oil. Moreover, several numerical simulations with plausible parameter values
show that the steady state multipliers of an increase in pR with respect to the real and
nominal variables q, q¤, y, y¤, p, p¤, pc, p¤c, i and i¤ are smaller (in absolute terms) than
the corresponding multipliers of a rise in p¤
R.33 This implies that with domestic-currency
denominated oil the long run stag°ationary e®ects upon both economies are reduced.34 If
we identify the domestic economy with the EMU and the foreign economy with the USA we
can say that both the EMU and the USA are better insulated against OPEC price shocks
32Note that the jump in T does not depend on the value of T. This is a general result which holds for any
jump variable of the model.






0 in absolute terms is considerably greater than the corresponding determinant in case of
foreign-currency denominated oil imports.
34Cf. Bhandari (1981) for small open economies.
11if oil imports are denominated in Euro rather than US dollars.35 Under domestic-currency
denomination, the rise of the equilibrium nominal exchange rate e and the domestic terms
of trade ¿ as well as the rise of the domestic and foreign real factor price of imported raw
materials is weakened.36 Since the long run output e®ect upon the steady state value of
real oil imports typically dominates the opposing real factor price e®ect there is a long
run reduction of real raw materials imports which is in general smaller when oil imports
are priced in Euro rather than US dollars. This result holds for both the domestic and
foreign economy. The improvement of the bilateral trade balances of the domestic and
foreign economy with respect to OPEC is therefore weakened in the long run.
Figure 6 shows the domestic and foreign output adjustment if imported raw materials
are denominated in terms of domestic currency. Each ¯gure also contains the output time
path in case of foreign-currency denominated oil. Under domestic-currency denomination
the positive impact e®ect on domestic output q is reduced. The real depreciation of the
domestic currency is now smaller, and the domestic real interest rate does not decrease
but increases on impact.37 After its initial jump real output q continues to rise during
the entire anticipation period while it falls if oil imports are denominated in terms of
US dollars. The reason for the opposite adjustment of q during the anticipation period
is the di®erent adjustment of the domestic real factor price. If oil imports are priced in
Euro, the real factor price pR ¡ p falls during the entire anticipation phase leading to a
rise in national income and private absorption. With foreign-currency denominated oil
just the opposite holds. The same arguments can be applied to the behavior of foreign
output. After its initial (negative) jump which is greater in case of domestic-currency
denominated oil, q¤ behaves like q, i.e. increases until time T.38 At time T of the oil
price increase and thereafter the adjustment of q and q¤ is in qualitative terms the same
as with foreign-currency denominated oil. After the discontinuous contraction at time T,
the output variables q and q¤ continue to fall. If the time span T between the anticipation
and the realization of the oil price shock is su±ciently large, then for all t > T q and q¤
lie above their corresponding values in the case of foreign-currency denominated oil.39
35A combination of these two polar cases, i.e. if OPEC ¯xes the price of oil in terms of a ¯xed weight basket
of currencies, leads to stag°ationary e®ects upon both economies which precisely lie between the cases of
Euro- and US dollar denominated oil (Wohltmann and Winkler, 2005).
36Although dpj(D) > dpj(E) and dp
¤j(D) > dp
¤j(E) holds (where D and E denote the Dollar and Euro regime
respectively), the steady state rise of the nominal exchange rate e leads to d(p¤
R + e ¡ p)j(D) > d(pR ¡ p)j(E)
and d(p¤
R ¡ p¤)j(D) > d(pR ¡ e ¡ p¤)j(E). Since the long run output supply according to (11) and (12) is





it follows that in absolute terms jdqj(D) > jdqj(E) and jdq
¤j(D) > jdq
¤j(E).
37On the other hand, the domestic real factor price pR ¡ p is now constant on impact (leaving private
absorption unchanged) while with foreign-currency denominated oil p
¤
R + e ¡ p initially rises.
38Note that the impact e®ect upon the output di®erential q¡q
¤ is again positive, but smaller compared with
foreign-currency denominated oil. The di®erential output now continues to increase after its initial jump
while it falls during the entire anticipation phase if crude oil is priced in dollars. The reason is that with
domestic-currency denominated oil the output di®erential q ¡ q
¤ is a negative function of the domestic
real factor price pR ¡ p which falls for 0 < t < T since p rises during the entire anticipation period. The
opposite holds if oil imports are priced in dollars. In this case q ¡ q
¤ is a negative function of the foreign
real factor price p
¤
R ¡ p
¤ which rises for 0 < t < T due to the de°ationary process in the foreign economy
during this time span.
39If T is su±ciently small, then for small values of t > T qj(D) > qj(E) and q
¤j(D) > q
¤j(E) holds. This is
12Next consider the development of the in°ation rates, _ p and _ p¤ (¯gure 6). With
domestic-currency denominated oil the direct e®ect of the rate of depreciation _ e on the
domestic in°ation rate _ p vanishes (cf. equation (11)). On the other hand, the dynamic
foreign price equation (12) now contains the term _ pR¡ _ e (instead of _ p¤
R). Since _ e is positive
throughout the entire anticipation phase it is obvious that for 0 < t < T the in°ation rate
in the domestic economy is reduced while the de°ationary process in the foreign economy
is reinforced.40 At the date of implementation the discontinuous increase of both _ p and _ p¤
is now smaller than with foreign-currency denominated oil. For t > T the in°ation rates
_ p and _ p¤ gradually decrease where the fall is slower than with US dollar denominated
oil. This implies that for su±ciently large, but ¯nite t > T the in°ation rates in the case
of domestic-currency denominated oil may be slightly greater than with foreign-currency
denominated oil (¯gure 6). On the other hand, for any t > T the continuous increase
of both the domestic and foreign price level after the implementation of the input price
shock is weakened under domestic currency denomination (¯gure 7).
5 Monetary Stabilization Policies
We have shown that an increase in the price of raw materials imports leads to stag°ation as
well as temporary balance of trade problem for oil-dependent economies, the precise degree
of severity of these e®ects depending upon the degree of oil-dependency and the currency
in which OPEC oil is denominated. This section analyzes the impacts of various monetary
policy rules that could be employed by the domestic and foreign economy in an e®ort to
reduce the potentially disruptive e®ects of oil price shocks. We ¯rst consider domestic and
foreign monetary policy rules that are calculated to ¯x the respective consumer in°ation
rate at its initial equilibrium level at all times. We both discuss the problem of unilateral
and simultaneous in°ation rate stabilization. Thereafter we analyze the question whether
monetary policy is able to neutralize the contractionary output e®ects that result from an
anticipated increase in the price of raw materials imports.
Consider ¯rst the problem of unilateral stabilization of the domestic in°ation rate
based on the consumer price index, _ pc. In the following we assume that oil imports are
priced in dollars. In a ¯rst step we analyze the question of in°ation rate stabilization
during the time span after the realization of the oil price shock, i.e. for t > T. Assume
that initially _ pc
0 = 0 holds which requires _ m0 = 0 at the initial steady state. Fixing the
domestic consumer in°ation rate _ pc at its equilibrium level _ pc
0 for all t > T may be achieved
by adjusting the growth rate of domestic money supply according to the policy rule41







especially the case if T = 0, i.e., if the oil price shock is not anticipated.
40Analogous results hold for the domestic price and wage in°ation rates _ p
c and _ w and the corresponding
foreign variables _ p
¤c and _ w
¤.
41An alternative approach to stabilize the in°ation rate in presence of oil price shocks utilizing an interest
rate monetary policy (Taylor-) rule (Taylor, 1993) is analyzed by Kamps and Pierdzioch (2002).
13This rule must be credibly announced at time t = 0 to be implemented at the date of
the materials price shock, T. Since a rise of the price of oil leads to temporary in°ation
(cf. ¯gure 4) it is obvious that _ m must be negative for T < t < 1 (¯gure 8). The policy
rule (26) not only ¯xes the consumer in°ation rate _ pc at its initial steady state level _ pc
0 for
t > T but also leads to a dampening of the domestic price and wage in°ation rates _ p and _ w
during this time span (¯gure 8). However, the negative output jump at time T is increased
(¯gure 8) since _ m is reduced at time T. Since the policy rule (26) is anticipated by the
public it causes adjustment dynamics during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T (¯gure 9).
The anticipation e®ects of the contractionary monetary policy rule (26) are stronger (and
opposite in sign) than the anticipation e®ects of the oil price shock. The anticipation of
the rule together with the anticipation of a future oil price hike on impact causes a positive
jump of the terms of trade ¿, a domestic output contraction and de°ation, i.e. a fall of
the in°ation rates _ p and _ pc during the whole anticipation phase 0 < t < T.42 On the other
hand, it leads to positive spillover e®ects for the foreign economy, i.e. to foreign output
expansion and foreign in°ation during the time span 0 < t < T (¯gure 9).
To avoid domestic de°ation during the anticipation period the monetary policy rule
(26) must already be implemented at the date of anticipation of the oil price increase, i.e.
at t = 0. It then guarantees _ pc = _ pc
0 = 0 both for t > T and t < T. During the time span
0 < t < T the growth rate of domestic money supply induced by the policy rule (26) is
positive (¯gure 10). This is not surprising since the anticipation of a future contraction of
the growth rate of money stock as a response to the oil price shock in T on impact causes
domestic disin°ation which can only be removed by an expansionary monetary policy over
the time interval 0 < t < T. The implementation of the rule (26) at time t = 0 instead of
t = T > 0 results in weaker jumps of the terms of trade ¿ and the output variables. This
holds since _ m is positive for 0 < t < T. In qualitative terms the adjustment dynamics
remain unchanged.
If the growth rate of domestic money supply follows the rule (26) it leads to a permanent
reduction of the domestic money stock (dm < 0) implying a weakening of the rise of the
long run domestic price level p and the exchange rate e induced by an isolated increase of
the US dollar price of oil (¯gure 8). Moreover, the domestic price index pc is ¯xed at its
initial steady state level at all times. On the other hand, the steady state e®ects of the oil
price shock with respect to real output and the real factor prices remain unchanged under
the monetary policy rule (26). Domestic monetary policy is neutral in the long run if oil
imports are denominated in terms of the foreign currency. In this case the raw materials
price expressed in units of the domestic currency, p¤
R + e, is an endogenous, full °exible
variable for the domestic economy. With full factor price °exibility, domestic monetary
policy must be ine±cient. Just the opposite holds for foreign monetary policy since with
foreign-currency denominated oil the factor price p¤
R is exogenously given for the foreign
42The fact that a credible announcement of a contractionary monetary policy leads to disin°ation even
before the contraction actually occurs is a well known result, see Ball (1994). Due to the contractionary
e®ect of the real appreciation we do not ¯nd { in contrast to Ball (1994) in an closed economy model { a
disin°ationary boom in our open economy framework.
14economy. It then plays the same role as a ¯xed nominal wage rate in traditional Keynesian
macroeconomic models. A permanent change of the foreign money stock takes place if
the foreign consumer in°ation rate _ p¤c is stabilized with the help of the foreign monetary
policy rule







As in the case of domestic in°ation rate stabilization the growth rate of foreign money
supply induced by the rule (27) is again negative for T < t < 1 so that the foreign
money stock is reduced in the long run (dm¤ < 0). If oil imports are priced in dollars
the steady state decline of foreign money stock causes { in isolation { a permanent rise
of the real factor prices p¤
R ¡ p¤ and p¤
R + e ¡ p and as a consequence a long run output
reduction in both economies. The contractionary steady state output e®ects of an increase
of the US dollar price of oil are therefore magni¯ed if the foreign monetary policy rule
(27) is implemented to ¯x the foreign consumer in°ation rate _ p¤c at its initial equilibrium
level through time. Our results support the view that contractionary monetary policy is
responsible for much of the decline in output following an oil price increase (Bernanke,
Gertler and Watson (1997), or more recently, Barsky and Kilian (2001)).
The foreign policy rule (27) also generates adjustment dynamics that are quite di®erent
from those of the domestic policy rule (26). In particular, the anticipation e®ects of an
announced oil price rise are not weakened but increased (¯gure 11). During the time span
0 < t < T the policy rule (27) causes a stronger domestic output expansion and foreign
output contraction as in the case of a passive foreign monetary policy. At time T domestic
output generally lies above its initial steady state level q0. Although the real factor prices
increase by a large amount in T, the strong fall of the domestic real interest rate and
the low value of the terms of trade ¿ at time T cause an output value q(T+) which may
be greater than q0. Thereafter, domestic output sharply decreases and overshoots for
su±ciently large t > T its new steady state level which is considerably smaller than the
steady state value q1 in case of a passive monetary policy. The overshooting of q can
be explained with a delayed overshooting of the domestic terms of trade ¿ and the real
interest rate i ¡ _ pc. For su±ciently large t > T domestic output converges from below to
its new equilibrium level. By contrast, foreign output permanently falls both during the
anticipation phase and the time span after the realization of the oil price increase.
A further striking di®erence between the domestic and foreign monetary policy rule
are their international spillover e®ects with respect to the price variables of the respective
passive country. During the time span after the implementation of the oil price increase,
the fall of the growth rate of domestic money supply generates time paths of the foreign
in°ation rates _ p¤, _ p¤c and _ w¤ which slightly run below the corresponding time paths in
case of a passive monetary policy. By contrast, the foreign monetary policy rule increases
the in°ationary e®ects of the oil price shock for the domestic economy by a large amount.
Since the long run fall of the foreign money stock causes a contraction of the steady state
output variables q and q¤ this in isolation leads to positive output gaps at time T and { as
a consequence { to a discontinuous rise of the wage and price in°ation rates _ w, _ w¤, _ p and
15_ p¤. The jumps in the foreign in°ation rates _ w¤ and _ p¤ can be more than compensated by
a su±ciently large reduction of the growth rate of foreign money supply at time T. This
is accompanied by a strong increase of the deprecation rate _ e in T causing an additional
rise of the domestic in°ation rates _ w, _ p and _ pc (¯gure 12). Thereafter, a strong fall of the
domestic variables _ p, _ w and _ pc takes place. For su±ciently large t > T these domestic
in°ation rates lie below their respective initial steady state level implying disin°ation at
the end of the adjustment process (¯gure 12).
A simultaneous stabilization of the domestic and the foreign consumer in°ation rate
at their respective initial steady state level requires an international monetary policy
coordination according to the policy rules (26) and (27). The implementation of both
rules at time t = 0 guarantees _ pc = _ p¤c = 0 for all t > 0. At time T domestic monetary
policy must be stronger contractionary than in the case of a unilateral stabilization of the
domestic in°ation rate _ pc (cf. ¯gure 10). The reason is the strong rise of _ pc caused by the
fall of the growth rate of foreign money supply in T. In contrast to the unilateral ¯xing
of the domestic in°ation rate at its initial equilibrium level, the growth rate of domestic
money stock is slightly positive for su±ciently large values of t > T. This holds since _ pc
gets negative for great values of t if _ m = 0 and _ m¤ follows the rule (27) (¯gure 12). During
the anticipation phase the growth rate of domestic money supply is stronger positive than
in the case of a passive foreign monetary policy. The anticipation of a strong contractionary
domestic monetary policy at time T in isolation leads to disin°ation over the anticipation
period. The de°ationary process can not be removed by the spillover e®ects of foreign
monetary policy and is stronger than in the case of a unilateral stabilization of _ pc for
t > T. In contrast to domestic monetary policy the growth rate of foreign money supply
is negative for 0 < t < T. The implementation of the domestic monetary policy rule (26)
causes relative strong foreign in°ationary e®ects over the time interval 0 < t < T. These
e®ects can not be completely neutralized by the anticipation e®ects of the contractionary
foreign monetary policy rule (27) if it is implemented at time T.
The simultaneous stabilization of the in°ation rates _ pc and _ p¤c with the help of the
monetary policy rules (26) and (27) generates output developments during the anticipation
phase which are similar to those in the case of a unilateral ¯xing of _ pc. For t > T the
output response is similar to the case of a unilateral ¯xing of _ p¤c where now for any t > T
both the domestic and the foreign output lie below their respective output level in the
case of a passive monetary policy. The long run output contraction in both economies
caused by the oil price shock coincides with the steady state output decline in case of a
unilateral stabilization of _ p¤c. The reason is that the long run fall of foreign money supply
(dm¤ < 0) does not change by the transition from unilateral to simultaneous in°ation rate
stabilization.
As yet we have discussed the problem of stabilization of the domestic and the foreign
consumer in°ation rate under the assumption that oil imports are priced in US dollars.
We can also analyze the same problem under domestic-currency denomination. In this
case domestic instead of foreign monetary policy is e±cient in the long run. The long run
16fall of domestic money supply that results from the simultaneous stabilization of _ pc and
_ p¤c leads to a magni¯cation of the contractionary output e®ects of an isolated oil price
increase. A remarkable result is that the steady state output contraction in case of active
monetary policy following the rules (26) and (27) is reinforced if oil imports are priced in
Euro rather than US dollars (¯gure 13). Note that just the opposite holds if monetary
policy is passive in both economies, i.e. if there is no in°ation rate ¯xing with suitable
monetary policy rules (cf. ¯gure 6). In the case of simultaneous in°ation rate stabilization
the long run fall of the domestic money stock is stronger than the long run decline of
foreign money supply (dm < dm¤ < 0) (cf. ¯gure 14). This holds independently of the
currency denomination. The changeover from foreign- to domestic-currency denominated
oil has the e®ect that the reduction of m and m¤ is increased (¯gure 14). With stronger
contractionary domestic monetary policy such a changeover magni¯es the long run rise of
the terms of trade ¿, the real factor prices and the real interest rates so that the steady
state output contraction is increased in both economies.
With domestic-currency denominated oil the deprecation rate _ e is not a direct argument
of the dynamic mark-up pricing rule for the domestic in°ation rate _ p while just the opposite
holds for the price equation of the foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ (cf. equations (26), (27)). The
simultaneous stabilization of the consumer in°ation rates leads to a negative and falling
value of the deprecation rate _ e over the whole anticipation period 0 < t < T. At time
T and for su±ciently small values of t > T the process of appreciation of the domestic
currency is magni¯ed (¯gure 13). This in isolation implies that the transition from foreign-
to domestic-currency denominated oil causes higher in°ation rates before and immediately
after the oil price increase. Compared with the case of foreign currency denomination the
required growth rates of domestic and foreign money stock for in°ation rate stabilization
must therefore be stronger negative for su±ciently small t > T leading to a stronger long
run fall of the domestic and the foreign money supply.
The simultaneous ¯xing of the consumer in°ation rates at their respective initial steady
state level with the help of the monetary policy rules (26) and (27) has the serious dis-
advantage that the long run output contraction caused by an isolated oil price shock is
reinforced. Moreover, it leads to a signi¯cant increase in the equilibrium real factor prices
of raw materials imports. The question therefore arises whether monetary policy is able
to neutralize the long run real e®ects of an isolated oil price increase. If oil imports are
priced in dollars, foreign monetary policy is e±cient while domestic monetary policy is
neutral in the long run. If the foreign money stock is increased by the same amount as
the US dollar price of oil (dm¤ = dp¤
R > 0), we get classical results:43
dp¤ = ¡de = dp¤c = dm¤ ; (28)
dx = 0 for x 2 fq;q¤;y;y¤;p¤
R ¡ p¤;p¤
R + e ¡ p;i;i¤;i ¡ _ pc;i¤ ¡ _ p¤c;p;pcg
Moreover, all adjustment dynamics caused by the anticipation of a future rise in p¤
R are
43An analogous result holds for domestic monetary policy under domestic currency denomination.
17completely removed so that the real variables, the interest rates and the domestic price
levels are ¯xed at their respective initial steady state level at all times. However, the
foreign price levels and the foreign currency price of domestic currency (¡e) increase by
the same amount as the foreign money stock. The rise of p¤, p¤c and e takes place at the
date of realization of the oil price increase. For t > T these variables remain at their new
steady state levels. The result is a permanent rise of the foreign price level which is greater
than the increase of the foreign price level in case of an isolated oil price shock.
6 Summary of the Main Results
This paper has analyzed a macrodynamic model of two large open economies which are
completely dependent upon oil imports from a small third country. It is assumed that
the domestic economy (the European Monetary Union) is stronger oil-dependent than the
foreign economy (the USA) and that the degree of wage indexation is greater in Europe
than in the US economy. The main results of the analysis may be summarized as follows:
(a) An anticipated once-and-for-all increase in the dollar price of oil will involve both
economies in a stag°ationary situation over the long run. Both economies su®er from
temporary in°ation, temporary balance of trade problems with respect to OPEC,
long run price and real factor price increases and a permanent output contraction.
The stag°ationary e®ects are stronger for the domestic economy because of its higher
degree of oil-dependency. Under a fairly weak condition the domestic terms of trade
with respect to the large foreign economy improve permanently while for both large
open economies the intermediate goods terms of trade with respect to the oil-exporter
deteriorate in the long run. Since domestic and foreign output falls the trade balances
with respect to the oil-exporting nation do not necessarily deteriorate in the long
run. On the contrary, several numerical simulations show that in general there is an
improvement of the bilateral trade balance.
(b) The impact e®ects of anticipated oil price shocks are in sharp contrast to the steady
state e®ects. The domestic terms of trade fall instantaneously causing a stimulation
of domestic real output above its pre-disturbance level. On the other hand, real
output of the large foreign economy decreases on impact where the decline is smaller
than the long run output contraction. The same holds for domestic and foreign
output at the date of implementation of the oil price increase. The discontinuous
rise of the real factor price of oil at the date of the materials price increase induces
both in the domestic and foreign economy a contraction of real output which is
smaller than the long run output reduction. This leads to a temporary deterioration
of the respective trade balance against the oil-exporting nation.
(c) The paper also discusses the dynamic e®ects of an oil price increase if oil is denom-
inated in terms of domestic currency (Euro) rather than US dollars. Under such
pricing the stag°ationary e®ects of oil price shocks are reduced. The long run rise of
18the real factor prices and the price levels as well as the fall of the output and income
variables is weakened in both economies. With domestic-currency denominated oil
both economies are better insulated against oil price increases, except for the fact
that the long run fall of real imports and the corresponding improvement of the
bilateral real trade balance with respect to the oil-exporting nation is weakened. On
impact, the jumps of the output variables are also weakened.
(d) The paper also analyzes two types of monetary stabilization policies. At ¯rst the
problem of stabilization of the consumer in°ation rate is discussed. It is shown that
an international monetary policy coordination is able to ¯x the domestic and foreign
consumer in°ation rate at its initial pre-disturbance steady state level at all times
simultaneously. The policy rules for the domestic and foreign growth rate of money
supply lead to a contractionary foreign monetary policy both before and after the
oil price shock. However, domestic monetary policy is only contractionary after the
realization of the materials price increase. The fall of the growth rate of domestic
money supply at the date of implementation of the oil price increase is stronger than
the corresponding decline of the growth rate of foreign money supply. Since the
anticipation of these policies leads to de°ation in the domestic economy, domestic
monetary policy must be expansionary prior to the implementation of the factor
price increase.
(e) Fixing the consumer in°ation rates at their respective initial steady state level with
the help of monetary policy rules is connected with a long run fall of the domestic
and foreign money stock. Under foreign-currency denomination of raw materials
imports, foreign monetary policy is e±cient in the long run and causes a magni¯ca-
tion of the contractionary output and real factor price e®ects of an isolated oil price
shock. The same holds for domestic monetary policy in the case of domestic-currency
denominated oil. Under such currency denomination the overall steady state output
contraction is stronger than in case of foreign-currency denominated oil. This stands
in contrast to the corresponding long run output e®ects of isolated oil price shocks.
(f) The paper also analyzes the ability of monetary policy to remove the contractionary
output e®ects of raw materials price increases. With foreign-currency denominated
oil expansionary foreign monetary policy is able to neutralize all adjustment dynam-
ics caused by an oil price shock and to ¯x all real variables of the domestic and foreign
economy at their respective initial steady state level. However, this is accompanied
by an equiproportional rise of the foreign price level and the foreign currency price
of domestic currency while the domestic price level remains unchanged. Domestic
monetary policy has the same classical results if oil imports are priced in Euro.
19Mathematical Appendix
A Foreign-Currency Denominated Oil Imports
We use the method by Aoki (1981) and transform the system (1){(18) into two subsystems,
a di®erence system and an aggregate system. The di®erence (aggregate) system consists
of the di®erence (aggregation) of corresponding equations of the domestic and foreign
economy (like the di®erence (sum) of the IS equations (1) and (2)). Since the supply side
of the domestic and foreign economy is asymmetric by assumption it is not possible to
solve the di®erence system independently of the aggregate system.
The dynamics of the di®erence system can be represented by the following system of
equations:
µ
¸·1 + a2(1 ¡ (® + ®¤))
¶

























_ ld + ¸(q ¡ q¤) + ¸·2( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) =
2c0 + g ¡ g¤ ¡ (2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã)¿ ¡
1
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(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)ld + (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(m¤ ¡ p¤
R)



























_ ls ¡ l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤) + l1(q ¡ q¤)
+ l1·2( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) = ld + (2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤)¿
where


















The aggregate system can be reduced to the dynamic equation
(a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·3 _ ¿ + (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·4_ ls (A6)
+ (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·5_ ld ¡ a2l2(_ pc + _ p¤c)
+ (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·6( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) + (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))(q + q¤) =
a2ls + (l2a1Ã ¡ a2(® ¡ ®¤))¿ + l2(g + g¤)
+ l2a1(Ã + Ã¤)(p¤ ¡ p¤
R) + 2a0l2 ¡ 2l0a2 ¡ 2d0a1l2
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Equations (A1), (A2) and (A6) represent the state space form of the whole model. In






















where the matrices B = (bij)1·i;j·3 and C = (cij)1·i;j·3 are de¯ned by
b11 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·4 + a2l2 (A14)
b12 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·3 ¡ a2l2(® ¡ ®¤) (A15)









































b32 = l1·1 + l2 (A21)













c11 = a2 ¡
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) (A23)








(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (A26)




(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (A28)
c31 = 0 (A29)
c32 = 2 ¡ (® + ®¤) (A30)
c33 = 1 (A31)
The dynamic system (A13) exhibits saddlepoint behavior. The system matrix G = B¡1C
has two stable and one unstable eigenvalue. Since the number of predetermined state vari-
ables coincides with the number of stable eigenvalues, there exists a uniquely determined
convergent solution time path of the state vector (Turnovsky, 2000). The solution method
can be found in Clausen and Wohltmann (2005) and Wohltmann and Winkler (2005). The
steady state of the dynamic system (A13) is obtained if for the state variables ls, ¿ and ld
the condition _ ls = _ ¿ = _ ld = 0 holds. Assuming _ m¤ = _ m = _ p¤
R = 0 the steady state system





























R ¡ dm¤) (A32)
where
f11 = ¸(f1 + f¤






2) ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)
¶
(A34)
f13 = ¡f12 (A35)
f21 = 2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤ ¡ l1(f1 + f¤
1 + f2) (A36)
















f33 = a2 ¡ f32 (A41)

















f22a2 ¡ f32 ¡f12a2 f12
f23f31 ¡ f21f33 f11f33 + f12f31 ¡f11f23 ¡ f12f21
















jFj = f12f31 ¡ f11f32 + a2(f11f22 ¡ f12f21) (A43)
The determinant jFj of the steady state matrix F = (fij)1·i;j·3 is in general positive.
(A42) together with the long run supply functions (17), (18) yields the steady state mul-
tipliers of a once-and-for-all increase of p¤
R (up to sign these multipliers coincide with the







> 0 , (A44)
¸(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)








































































































, f11(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > 2f12(f1 + f¤
1 + f2) (A53)
, (f2 ¡ f¤
2)
¡
2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã
¢
+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(f1 + f¤
1 + f2) > 0
23This inequality is met since we have assumed Ã > Ã¤, f2 > f¤
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R if ¾¤ · ¾ and f12 > 0.
B Domestic-Currency Denominated Oil Imports
If raw materials imports are denominated in terms of domestic rather than foreign currency























^ b11 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·4 + a2l2 = b11 (B2)
^ b12 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))^ ·3 ¡ a2l2(® ¡ ®¤) (B3)
^ b13 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))^ ·5 (B4)













^ b22 = ¸^ ·1 + a2(1 ¡ (® + ®¤)) (B6)


























^ b32 = l1^ ·1 + l2 (B9)













^ c11 = a2 ¡
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) = c11 (B11)
^ c12 = ¡l2a1Ã¤ ¡ a2(® ¡ ®¤) (B12)
^ c13 = ¡
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) (B13)
24^ c21 = ¡
1
2
(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) = c21 (B14)
^ c22 = ¡(2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã¤) (B15)
^ c23 = ¡
1
2
(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (B16)
^ c31 = 0 = c31 (B17)
^ c32 = 2 ¡ (® + ®¤) = c32 (B18)














































^ f11 ^ f12 ^ f13
^ f21 ^ f22 ^ f23























A(dpR ¡ dm) (B23)
with
^ f11 = ¸(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2) + 2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã¤ (B24)





2) ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)
¶
= ¡f12 (B25)
^ f13 = ^ f12 (B26)
^ f21 = 2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤ ¡ l1(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2) = f21 (B27)
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^ f33 = a2 + ^ f32 (B32)
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j^ Fj = ^ f11 ^ f32 ¡ ^ f12 ^ f31 + a2( ^ f11 ^ f22 ¡ ^ f12 ^ f21) > jFj (B34)
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, ^ f11(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > ¡2 ^ f12(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2) (B44)
, ^ f11(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > 2f12(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2)
, (f2 ¡ f¤
2)
¡
2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã¤¢
+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2) > 0
Since f2 > f¤
2 and Ã > Ã¤ by assumption, inequality (B44) is met if inequality (A53)
holds.
C Stabilization Policies
We restrict the discussion to the case of foreign-currency denominated oil imports and to
the stabilization of the consumer in°ation rates _ pc and _ p¤c for all t > 0. The unilateral
¯xing of the domestic in°ation rate _ pc with the help of the monetary policy rule (26)
changes the structure of the state matrix B in (A13). It has to be replaced by e B = (e bij)
where




e b12 = b12 ¡ a2l2(1 ¡ ®) (C2)




e b21 = b21 (C4)
e b22 = b22 (C5)
e b23 = b23 (C6)




e b32 = b32 ¡ l2(1 ¡ ®) (C8)




27The unilateral stabilization of the foreign in°ation rate _ p¤c with the aid of the foreign
monetary policy rule (27) leads to adjustments of both the state matrices B and C in
(A13). With foreign-currency denominated oil the foreign real factor price p¤
R¡p¤ depends
on m¤ (cf. (A8)) where m¤ results from the policy rule for _ m¤ by integration:











The matrices B and C have now to be replaced by B0 = (b0
ij) and C0 = (c0
ij) where
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12 = b12 + a2l2(1 ¡ ®¤) ¡ (1 ¡ ®¤)
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22 = b22 ¡ ¸·2(1 ¡ ®¤) (C15)
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31 = b31 +
1
2
(l2 + l1·2) (C17)
b0
32 = b32 ¡ (l2 + l1·2)(1 ¡ ®¤) (C18)
b0
33 = b33 ¡
1
2
(l2 + l1·2) (C19)
c0
11 = c11 +
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) = a2 (C20)
c0
12 = c12 ¡ l2a1(Ã + Ã¤)(1 ¡ ®¤) (C21)
c0
13 = c13 ¡
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) = 0 (C22)
c0
21 = c21 +
1
2
(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) = 0 (C23)
c0
22 = c22 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(1 ¡ ®¤) (C24)
c0
23 = c23 ¡
1
2
(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) = 0 (C25)
c0
31 = c31 (C26)
c0
32 = c32 (C27)
c0
33 = c33 (C28)
The steady state matrix F in (A32) also changes its structure since the foreign monetary
policy rule (27) implies a long run change of the foreign money supply according to











28The F matrix in (A32) must therefore be replaced by F0 = (f0
ij) where
f0
11 = f11 ¡ 2f12(1 ¡ ®¤) (C30)
f0
12 = 0 (C31)
f0
13 = 0 (C32)
f0
21 = f21 + 2f23(1 ¡ ®¤) (C33)
f0
22 = 1 (C34)
f0
23 = 0 (C35)
f0
31 = f31 ¡ 2f32(1 ¡ ®¤) (C36)
f0
32 = 0 (C37)
f0
33 = a2 (C38)
Note that the determinant
jF0j = a2(f11 ¡ 2f12(1 ¡ ®¤)) (C39)
is considerably smaller than jFj. In the case of a simultaneous stabilization of the in°ation
rates _ pc and _ p¤c the state matrices B, C and F have to be replaced by B00 = e B+B0 ¡B,
C0 and F0 respectively. The endogenization of domestic and foreign growth rate of money
supply according to the policy rules (26) and (27) does not result in dynamic instability.
Several numerical simulations with realistic parameter values indicate that the saddle point
stability continues to hold, but the unstable eigenvalue increases by a large amount. The
strongest rise takes place if the domestic and foreign consumer in°ation rate are pegged
simultaneously at their initial steady state level at all times by utilizing (26) and (27).
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Figure 1: Steady state e®ects of the input-price increase
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Figure 2: Response of nominal exchange rate e (dotted line), terms of trade ¿ and price di®er-
ential p ¡ p¤ (solid lines) to an anticipated oil price shock during the time span 0 < t < T = 1
(left) and for t > T = 1 (right)
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Figure 3: Response of domestic price level p, domestic in°ation rate _ p, consumer price in°ation
rate _ pc and wage in°ation rate _ w (solid lines) and foreign price level p¤, foreign in°ation rate _ p¤,
consumer price in°ation rate _ p¤c and wage in°ation rate _ w¤ (dashed lines) to an anticipated oil
price shock, initial steady states (dotted lines)
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Figure 4: Response of domestic output q and income y (solid lines), foreign output q¤ and income
y¤ (dashed lines) as well as output and income di®erential q ¡ q¤ and y ¡ y¤ to an anticipated
oil price shock, initial steady states (dotted lines)
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Figure 5: Response of domestic real factor price p¤
R + e ¡ p, domestic real interest rate i ¡ _ pc,
domestic real oil imports imR (solid lines), foreign real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤, foreign real interest
rate i ¡ _ p¤c and foreign real oil imports im¤
R (dashed lines) to an anticipated oil price shock,
respective initial steady states (dotted lines)
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Figure 6: Response of domestic output q and in°ation rate _ p and foreign output q¤ and in°ation
rate _ p¤ to an anticipated oil price shock for domestic-currency denominated oil (dotted lines)
and for foreign-currency denominated oil (solid lines)
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Figure 7: Response of domestic price level p, domestic consumer price index pc, foreign price level
p¤ and foreign consumer price index p¤c to an anticipated oil price shock for domestic-currency
denominated oil (dotted lines) and for foreign-currency denominated oil (solid lines)
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Figure 8: Domestic monetary policy _ m according to the rule (26) and response of domestic in-
°ation rate _ p, domestic wage in°ation rate _ w, domestic output q, domestic price p and exchange
rate e (dashed lines) in comparison to the unstabilized time paths (solid lines) during the time
span t > T
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Figure 9: E®ects of the anticipation of the domestic monetary rule together with the anticipation
of a future oil price hike on the terms of trade ¿, domestic output q, domestic consumer price
and price in°ation rate _ p and _ pc, foreign output q¤ and foreign consumer price in°ation rate _ p¤c
(dashed lines) in comparison to the anticipation e®ects of an unstabilized oil price shock (solid
lines)
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Figure 10: Growth rate of domestic money supply _ m needed to achieve the in°ation target _ pc = 0
during the whole adjustment process
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Figure 11: E®ects of the foreign monetary policy rule implemented at time t = 0 together with
the anticipation and the implementation of an oil price increase on terms of trade ¿, domestic
output q, foreign output q and domestic real interest rate i ¡ _ pc (dashed lines) in comparison to
the e®ects of an isolated oil price shock (solid lines) for 0 < t < T (left) and t > T (right)
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Figure 12: E®ects of the foreign monetary policy rule implemented at time t = 0 together with
the anticipation and the implementation of an oil price increase on domestic wage in°ation _ w,
domestic price in°ation _ p, domestic consumer price in°ation _ pc and exchange rate _ e (dashed
lines) in comparison to the e®ects of an isolated oil price shock (solid lines) for 0 < t < T (left)
and t > T (right)
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Figure 13: Response of domestic output q, foreign output q¤ and depreciation rate _ e to an inter-
national monetary policy coordination in order to achieve the in°ation targets _ pc = 0 = _ p¤c before
(0 < t < T) and after an oil price shock (t > T) for domestic-currency denominated oil (dashed
lines) and for foreign-currency denominated oil (solid lines)
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Figure 14: Growth rates of domestic and foreign money supply _ m and _ m¤ needed to achieve
the in°ation target _ pc = 0 = _ p¤ for 0 < t < T (left) and t > T (right) and the resulting
developments of money stocks _ m and _ m¤ for domestic-currency denominated oil (dashed lines)
and for foreign-currency denominated oil (solid lines)
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